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Extended Abstract 
Purpose: This study explores the inter-organisational dynamics, in terms of the triggers to spin-off 
formation and the genealogical inheritance of spin-offs, between a parent characterised by an adverse 
event and the spin-offs that emerge. The study focuses on the nature of the triggering event, exploring 
the heterogeneous nature of the processes by which some spin-offs are formed to exploit new 
opportunities created unexpectedly by an adverse event, and on the genealogical inheritance that forms 
the pre-entry experience of the founder. 
Design/methodology/approach: A case study based on interview data with founders of spin-offs, 
supplemented with interviews with managers and industry experts, and with secondary data sources. 
The case study is of the spin-offs from a successful firm, Élan Corporation, reported to be the world’s 
20th largest drug firm in 2002, that experienced an adverse event in 2002. The Élan case offers the 
opportunity to focus exclusively on what Buenstorf (2009) refers to as necessity spin-offs. Prior to 
collecting data it was necessary to identify the population of spin-offs from Élan. 
Findings: This study extends existing research by identifying ‘opportunistic spin-offs’: spin-offs that 
occur in the wake of an adverse event where the entrepreneur exploits an unexpected opportunity to 
engage in entrepreneurship but does not feel compelled to establish the spin-off. These spin-offs are 
characterised by ‘unexpected opportunities’, ‘opportunistic acquisition of assets’ and, perhaps 
reflecting the seniority and experience of those involved, ‘alternative employment opportunities’.  
Originality/value: Understanding the process of spin-off formation is important because it provides 
insight into how and why individuals initiate new ventures. Spin-offs are an important source of new 
firms and an important mechanism in the process of industry evolution. The study contributes to the 
literature on spin-offs by providing evidence of the heterogeneous nature of spin-offs that occur in the 
aftermath of an adverse event, leading to the classification of some spin-offs as ‘opportunistic spin-
offs’. The study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by demonstrating that an important trigger 
for venture creation is unexpected changes in an individual’s employment circumstances.  
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1. Introduction 
The prior organisational experience of entrepreneurs is an important determinant of 
‘how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and services are 
discovered, evaluated, and exploited’ (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000: 218). Ventures in many 
industries emerge through processes variously referred to as ‘spin-offs’ and ‘spawning’ 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Basu et al., 2015; Chatterji, 2009; Klepper 2001), where entrepreneurs 
draw on opportunities and resources from their prior workplace. Notwithstanding the 
importance of spin-offs, much of existing entrepreneurship research focuses on individuals that 
create de novo organisations, rather than de alio organisations, that is ‘entrepreneurial ventures 
with their roots in the prior organizational experiences of their founders’ (Walsh and Bartunek, 
2011:1017), or fails to distinguish between the two types of new organisations (Helfat and 
Lieberman, 2002; Walsh and Bartunek, 2011).1  
This paper explores, by means of a case study, the inter-organisational dynamics, in 
terms of the triggers to spin-off formation and the genealogical inheritance of spin-offs, 
between a parent characterised by an adverse event and the spin-offs that emerge. Spin-offs, 
an important form of de alio organisation, are a central feature of a number of streams of 
research, including theories of spin-offs (Cordes et al., 2014; Klepper, 2008), studies of 
entrepreneurial spawning that emphasise how some organisational contexts facilitate spin-offs 
(Chatterji, 2009; Cordes et al., 2014; Gompers et al., 2005) and the genealogical theory of 
entrepreneurship that argues that the knowledge an entrepreneur uses in starting a new business 
is strongly influenced by their prior organisational experience (Basu et al., 2015); theories of 
industry evolution that emphasise how the spillover of knowledge between a parent firm and 
                                                          
1 New ventures may be considered de novo, that is, new ventures without any connections to a parent organisation, 
or de alio, that is, new ventures supported by, or related to, an existing parent organisation (Helfat and Lieberman, 
2002). De novo means ‘from the beginning’, ‘anew’, or ‘beginning again’, while, in contrast de alio means ‘from 
another’. In some streams of research de alio refers to entrants that come from another industry (for example, 
Carroll et al., 1996). 
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spin-offs serves as a mechanism for perpetuating industry development (Arthur, 1994; 
Boschma and Wenting, 2007; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Klepper, 2007; Buenstorf and 
Klepper, 2009; Cordes et al., 2014; Mostafa and Klepper, 2010; Boschma and Frenken, 2011); 
an extensive body of research that explores the processes of commercialisation of knowledge 
created in Public Research Institutions (PRIs) (Mustar et al., 2006; Lockett et al., 2005; 
O’Gorman et al., 2008; Rasmussen, 2011); the Knowledge Spillover Theory of 
Entrepreneurship (KSTE) that argues that the spillover of knowledge through processes of 
spin-off formation is an important element in national and regional economic growth (Acs et 
al., 2013); and a body of research that explores corporate venturing (Narayanan et al., 2009). 
Corporate spin-offs, defined as “new business formation based on the business ideas 
developed within the parent firm being taken into a self-standing firm” (Parhankangas and 
Arenius, 2003:464), can be considered to include both new entities and the spin-off of existing 
activities, such as management buy-ins and buy-outs (Fryges and Wright, 2014). Parhankangas 
and Arenius identify three types of corporate spin-offs based on three factors: the 
complementary of the resource base of the parent and spin-off, the intensity of the collaboration 
between the parent and spin-off, and the dependence of the spin-off on the parent for resources 
(2003). Their taxonomy includes two spin-off types that maintain close collaboration with the 
parent firm - those that they describe as spin-offs that are serving new markets (new relative to 
the parent) and those that are using new technologies (again, new relative to the parent). The 
third spin-off type, the restructuring spin-off, emerges in the context of the parent seeking to 
restructure business units with mature technologies, with these spin-offs becoming ‘totally 
isolated from the other operations of the parent firm’ (2003: 476).   
Some spin-offs emerge in the context of an adverse event at a parent firm (Eriksson and 
Kuhn, 2006; Buenstorf, 2009). Spin-offs that emerge in the context of an adverse event have 
been referred to as ‘necessity spin-offs’ (Buenstorf, 2009; Bruneel et al. 2012) and ‘pushed 
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spin-offs’ (Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006). The term necessity spin-off, that is, spin-offs that are 
‘triggered by an adverse event that renders future employment at the parent firm less attractive 
or even impossible’, emerged in the context of Buenstorf’s study of the German laser industry 
(2009). While the adverse events referred to by Buenstorf included bankruptcy of a parent firm 
and the decision of a parent firm to abandon a market, subsequent research has used the 
necessity spin-off term in the context of other adverse events. For example, Bruneel et al. 
classify spin-offs as necessity spin-offs if they are created ‘in response to an adverse 
development in the parent firm’ (2012: 944); Cordes et al. (2014) classify spin-offs as necessity 
spin-offs if they occur in the context of changes in a parent’s culture; and Eriksson and Kuhn 
classify spin-offs as ‘pushed’ if the parent firm is characterised by weak sales growth (2006).  
A significant body of empirical work has demonstrated how some adverse events, such 
as the break-up of one firm can unleash a wave of spin-off companies. This is illustrated in the 
case of the break-up of American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) in the 1980s 
and 1990s resulting a wave of spin-off companies such as Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Lucent 
Technologies – now Alcatel-Lucent, and Verizon Wireles, that themselves subsequently 
become drivers of innovation and sources of second generation spin-off companies. Other 
examples include Roche and Novartis in Switzerland in the 1980s and 1990s (Fuhrer and 
Messerli, 2011) and Pharmacia in Uppsala, Sweden in the 1990s (Waxell and Malmberg, 
2007). Notwithstanding the importance of spin-offs created in the context of an adverse event, 
research has not focussed specifically on spin-offs described as necessity spin-offs (Buenstorf, 
2009; Bruneel et al., 2012; Cordes et al., 2014). 
Informed by theories of spin-off formation (Klepper, 2008; Cordes et al., 2014) this 
paper studies a successful multinational firm that experienced an adverse event that unleashed 
a wave of spin-off activity. Élan Corporation, reported to be the world’s 20th largest drug firm 
in 2002, embarked on an unanticipated divestment strategy, including a reduction in employee 
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numbers and debt, in the aftermath of a US Securities Exchange Commission investigation into 
accounting irregularities. The rapid sale of intellectual property and product rights that ensued, 
as well as the divestment of units, served as the catalyst for a sudden surge in Élan-related spin-
off formation. The spin-offs that emerged from the Élan crises include what industry experts 
describe as the most successful firms in the Irish biotechnology sector. At the time, some of 
the largest private equity and venture capital investments in Ireland involved Élan spin-offs. A 
number of these spin-offs experienced significant initial success, at least in terms of attracting 
external funding and listings on international stock markets. This is not typically the case for 
many entrants in the bio-technology sector, including the Irish biotechnology sector, where 
new ventures are often founded by academics (Oliver, 2004), whose motives are frequently to 
find new ways of pursuing their research interests (Meyer, 2003).  
Analysis of the case study of Élan Corporation shows that the adverse event created 
unexpected opportunities that led to the observed spin-off formation. The study contributes to 
the literature on spin-offs by providing evidence of the heterogeneous nature of spin-offs that 
occur in the aftermath of an adverse event, leading to the argument that a more meaningful 
classification of some spin-offs that emerge in the wake of an adverse event includes 
‘opportunistic spin-offs’. This more fine-grained distinction of spin-off type is important as it 
could provide a better understanding of the parent-progeny relationship and help resolve the 
conflicting empirical finding on the relative performance of spin-offs. More generally, the 
study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by demonstrating that an important trigger 
for venture creation is unexpected changes in an individual’s employment circumstances, and 
that these ventures are characterised by founders who did not anticipate starting a new venture 
and who did not anticipate the opportunities. 
 
2. Literature review 
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2.1 Theories of spin-off formation  
Central to theories of spin-offs, including Klepper’s theory of industry evolution (2008), 
Cordes et al. (2014) theory of spin-offs, and Acs et al.’s Knowledge Spillover Theory of 
Entrepreneurship (KSTE) (2013), is the argument that knowledge developed in organisations 
creates opportunities for some individuals to leave to create new ventures, with the pre-
founding experience of the entrepreneur involved in the spin-off process having important 
implications on both the decision to spin-off and the subsequent performance of the spin-off 
(Cordes et al., 2014; Klepper, 2008; Acs et al., 2013). These theories of spin-offs seek to 
explain under what conditions spin-offs occur, with reference to the parent organisation and 
the founding entrepreneurs of the spin-off, the general conditions that lead to knowledge within 
organisations ‘spilling over’ through a process of spin-off formation, and the impact of the 
genealogical inheritance of spin-offs on subsequent performance (Basu et al. 2015). 
In a series of influential papers Klepper developed a formal model of the evolution of 
industrial concentrations driven by spin-off processes (1997; 2001; 2008). The theory 
characterises how spin-off firms drive evolution through a process of organisational 
reproduction and inherited company traits. Klepper argues that the competence of firms is 
based on their pre-entry experience (1997, 2001, 2008). Klepper’s work has informed research 
on spin-offs and emerging models of spin-off processes, such as Cordes et al. (2014) 
explanation of successful regions in terms of firms that provide ‘training grounds’ for 
entrepreneurs. In summary, Klepper argues that (i) a arrange of factors trigger spin-offs, and 
(ii) that a firm’s pre-entry experience critically shapes its competence, which in turn influences 
its competitiveness, its chance of survival and growth, and the rate at which it generates further 
spin-offs. Klepper’s theory has been used in studies of the German laser industry (Buenstorf, 
2009), the US tyre industry (Klepper, 2002; Buenstorf and Klepper, 2009), Detroit’s 
automobile industry and Silicon Valley’s integrated circuits industry (Klepper, 2007; 2010), 
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the British Automobile industry (Boschma and Wenting, 2007), and the Amsterdam banking 
industry (Boschma and Ledder, 2010), among others.  
 
2.2 Triggers to spin-of formation 
There are two broad explanations for spin-off formation – one which emphases the role of 
small firms as positive incubators for potential entrepreneurs to learn the skills and acquire the 
tangible and intangible resources required to start-up, – and a second which suggests that the 
reluctance or inability of large bureaucratic firms to exploit opportunities facilitates, or 
frustrates, employees to leave to exploit these opportunities (Gompers et al., 2005). According 
to Fryges and Wright (2014) these two causes of spin-off formation can be described as 
opportunity spin-offs, spin-offs formed in order to pursue new business opportunities (Klepper 
and Thompson, 2010), and necessity spin-offs, which are spin-offs triggered by an adverse 
event that renders future employment at the parent firm less attractive or even impossible 
(Buenstorf, 2009) (Figure 1).  
Klepper and Thompson (2010) identify a number of distinct triggers  of intra-industry 
spin-offs. First, an employee makes a serendipitous discovery of some economic value, which 
the employee implements through his own start-up firm rather than reveal it to his employer 
(Bankman and Gilson, 1999; Amador and Landier, 2003; Hellman, 2007). Second, a discovery 
within the firm is viewed as being less valuable to the incumbent than it would be to a start-up, 
as to pursue it would exhaust existing rents or require competences not present in the incumbent 
firm. For example, Cassiman and Ueda (2006) posit that start-up firms may appear to be more 
“innovative” due to the fact that they are more likely to pursue projects that do not fit with the 
established firms’ existing assets.  
Third, employees exploit, by setting up their own firm, in the same industry, knowledge 
they gain from successful employers regarding how to compete profitably in their industry 
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(Franco and Filson, 2006). Klepper and Thompson (2010) argue that strategic disagreements 
arising from the inherent difficulties facing decision makers in evaluating new ideas, 
employees may opt to resign from the incumbent firm and establish new firms in the same 
industry.  
Necessity spin-offs, as developed by Buenstorf (2009), refer to those spin-offs which are 
triggered by an adverse event, which render future employment at the parent firm less attractive 
or even impossible. In classifying spin-offs as necessity, Bruneel et al. define necessity spin-
offs as ‘the creation of a spin-off in response to an adverse development in the parent firm’ 
(2012: 944). Adverse events include buy-outs; bankruptcy; downsizing; outsourcing; 
relocation; and divestiture (Lazonick, 2004).  
The context of Buenstorf’s (2009) study of necessity spin-off formation is the German 
laser industry over the period 1960-2003. He identified 48 spin-offs out of a total of 143 
entrants over the 43 year period. Spin-offs were categorised as necessity spin-offs where there 
was substantial evidence that the impetus for their organization was based on events at the 
parent firm. Of the 13 necessity spin-offs identified, five relate to bankruptcy of the parent firm, 
seven relate to the parent firm abandoning the laser industry or a specific laser market, and one 
spin-off was founded by a leading R&D employee of a parent firm. The remaining 28 firms 
were classified as opportunity spin-offs, where the founders had discovered new opportunities 
on which to base their business models. No evidence emerged to indicate that the organization 
of these firms was due to adverse developments at the parent firm. 
While Buenstorf’s classification is of two separate types of spin-offs, necessity spin-offs, 
where the impetus for the spin-off was based on events at the parent firm, which are contrasted 
with opportunity spin-offs, where the trigger relates to the individual’s desire to exploit an 
opportunity recognised in the course of employment, subsequent research by Bruneel et al. 
(2012), which identified twelve necessity spin-offs, suggest that the spin-offs categorised as 
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necessity are heterogeneous in terms of the nature of the triggering event (e.g. bankruptcy, the 
acquisition of the parent, and the parent’s decision to discontinue a project).  
Cordes et al. (2014) have extended possible explanations of adverse events or crisis that 
trigger necessity spin-offs to include changes to the parent’s corporate culture. Parent 
organisations differ in terms of cultures, structures, employment practices, incentive systems 
and these factors may influence both the level of spin-offs and the performance of spin-offs 
(Clarysse and Moray, 2004).  Cordes et al. (2014) propose that ‘with increasing firm size, a 
cooperative regime is becoming more and more difficult to sustain. The final drop in the level 
of cooperation is motivating entrepreneurially minded agents to the leave the organisation to 
found a spin-off’ (2014: 699). More generally, Audretsch et al.’s ‘commercialisation efficiency 
hypothesis’ argues that some incumbent organisations are less efficient at exploiting new 
knowledge and therefore be characterised by more spin-offs (2006).  
 
2.3 Inherited competences of spin-offs 
Founders inherit much of their expertise from their parent (Basu et al., 2015). Of three types 
of entrants identified by Klepper, ‘spin-offs’ perform best because of their higher level of 
organisational and industry experience (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Sapienza et al., 2004). 
Klepper classifies entrants as one of three types: ‘spin-offs’, which are founded by employees 
from incumbent firms, ‘start-ups’, which are founded by employees of firms in related 
industries or other capitalists with no experience in the new industry, and ‘diversifiers’, which 
are entrants that diversify from related industries. While Klepper’s ‘spin-offs’ outperform 
‘start-ups’ and ‘diversifiers’, there is also evidence that there is heterogeneity in the 
performance of ‘spinoffs’.  
For example, Eriksson and Kuhn find that opportunity spin-offs (what they describe as 
‘pulled’ spin-offs) are characterised by superior performance relative to ‘pushed’ spin-offs, that 
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is spin-offs from parent firms that are characterised by weak sales growth (2006). However, 
this is not a universally accepted proposition, in that Rocha et al. find that ‘pushed’ spin-offs, 
defined as ‘where parent firm either closed or suffered a substantial downsizing’ (a 30% or 
more decrease in the workforce) and where the spin-off is in the same or related industry, 
perform better, in terms of survival, relative to ‘pulled spin-offs’ (2015:128). They attribute 
this difference to the superior human capital endowments, in terms of the entrepreneurial 
experience, of the pushed spin-offs.  
It is argued that successful incumbent firms give birth to successful spin-offs (Boschma 
and Frenken, 2011, Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006). The superior performance of spin-offs from 
successful parents is assumed to be because of the superior genealogical inheritance of the spin-
offs, which gives the spin-offs a comparative advantage in terms of identifying successful 
opportunities. However, alternative explanations are that better performing organisations are 
characterised by better employees or by less risk adverse employees (Cabral and Wang, 2009). 
That is, the superior performance of some spin-offs could be explained in terms of the ability 
of better employees to create better performance in the parent pre-spin-off, and therefore, the 
performance of the spin-off is due to these firms having better founders. Another alternative 
explanation for the performance of spin-offs is that the level of inherited competence depends 
on the founder’s level of pre-entry experience (Phillips, 2002). Phillips finds that spin-offs 
founded by formerly higher ranked employees, enjoy higher survival rates (2002).  
Understanding what knowledge and organisational competences spin-offs inherit from 
their parent is important because the nature and sources of opportunity matter in the 
entrepreneurial process (Renko et al. 2012) and because ‘knowledge gaps’ across multiple 
stages of the spin-off process may explain the performance of a spin-off (Lockett et al., 2005). 
Klepper loosely defines the concept of organisational knowledge and competence as a firm’s 
“competence at doing R&D”, its ability to “manage the R&D process” (Klepper, 2008), or its 
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ability to “manage technological change” (Klepper, 2010). However, recent research has 
attempted to provide a more nuanced distinction between, say, the transfer of technical ‘R&D 
competence’ and broader ‘innovation competence’ from parent to spin-off (Agarwal et al., 
2004; Chatterji 2009; Asheim et al., 2011; Lejpras, 2014; Qian and Acs, 2013).  
Agarwal, et al. suggests that greater levels of technical knowledge in spin-offs is 
associated with longer survival (2004), though some recent research suggests that the degree 
of divergence in technical knowledge between the spin-off and the parent, has a U shaped 
relationship with spin-off performance, as measured by forward patent citation of the new 
venture’s patents (Basu, et al. 2015). Chatterji (2009) provides a broader definition of what 
constitutes the inherited competence of a spin-off, including in the industry context of their 
study: specific regulatory knowledge relating to FDA approvals and the Medicare 
reimbursement process (in the context of a study in the Medical Device sector); marketing 
knowledge (of how to market to physicians); and knowledge relating to how to identify new 
market opportunities in the sector. This distinction between knowledge types is emphasised in 
Qian and Acs’s extension of the KSTE (2013). They argue that the capacity of an individual to 
‘understand new knowledge, recognise its value, and subsequently commercialise it by creating 
a firm’ relies on individual’s possessing two types of knowledge, scientific knowledge and 
market or business knowledge. 
 
2.4 Research question 
In summary, any understanding of why spin-offs occur, and of the genealogical inheritance of 
spin-offs, requires an understanding of the founding conditions of the spin-off, in the context 
of the parent organisation. While empirical studies support the view that conditions in the 
parent organisation are an important trigger to spin-off formation, with the inherited 
organisational knowledge and capabilities of spin-off firms affecting both the initial 
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performance and long-run survival rates of spin-offs, the mechanism of spin-off formation and 
the genealogical inheritance across spin-offs are still unresolved issues (Agarwal and 
Braguinsky, 2014). 
The study is framed by the question: is there heterogeneity in the triggers to spin-offs 
formed in the context of an adverse event? Informed by theories of spin-off formation this 
study explores the inter-organisational dynamics between a parent firm which experiences an 
adverse event and the spin-offs that unexpectedly emerge. The focus is on the nature of the 
triggering event, exploring the heterogeneous nature of the processes by which some spin-offs 
are formed to exploit new opportunities created unexpectedly by an adverse event, and on the 
genealogical inheritance that forms the pre-entry experience of the founder. Our process-based 
approach seeks to identify the ‘generative mechanisms that explain particular sequences of 
events’ in the context of new ventures that emerge in the context of a corporate characterised 
by an adverse event (Dimov, 2010:70).  
 
 
 
 
3. Methodological approach 
3.1 Research approach 
Our inductive study, based on a case study using qualitative interview data, supplemented with 
secondary data sources, is appropriate as our research requires an understanding of how spin-
offs emerge. As we consider spin-off formation to be a socially embedded, ‘processual’ 
phenomenon (Low and MacMillan, 1988) we explore the relationship between an adverse 
event at a parent and the spin-off organisations that occurred in the aftermath of this event using 
a case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). This approach is consistent with Dimov’s call for 
more entrepreneurship research that focuses on process explanations, that is a focus on ‘the 
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specific path – in terms of a sequence of events or concrete experiences- that observed cases 
follow from one state to another’ (2010:70).  
Yin (2003) suggests an appropriate strategy in case study research is to select a case 
that illustrates and exemplifies the issues of interest. This research required a firm where an 
adverse event occurred and where spin-offs occurred after the adverse event. The case context 
selected was that of Élan Corporation, an Irish biotechnology firm that experienced an adverse 
event, and the twelve spin-offs that occurred in the period following this event. The unit of 
analysis for this study is the spin-off firm. Multiple definitions exist for the terms spin-off and 
spin-out (for a discussion see Myint et al., 2005). Definitional issues are further confused by 
the fact that the meaning of the two terms tends to be inverted in Europe and the USA. In this 
research we use the term spin-off and apply a definition that covers firms formed by employees 
or groups of employees leaving an existing organisation to form an independent start-up. The 
start-up is only considered a spin-off if the employees received some form of assistance or 
support or stimulation from the parent organisation or if it is based on intellectual property or 
a core capability developed during the employees’ stay at the parent organisation. Details of 
the spin-offs, in terms of year of start-up, activity, the former roles of the founder(s), and data 
sources used, are provided in Table 1.  
 
3.2 Data collection and analysis 
Prior to collecting data on the spin-offs it was necessary to identify the population of spin-offs 
from Élan that occurred following the adverse event. Using information from an analysis of 
three secondary data sources, the Irish Times (an Irish newspaper) archive, the FAME database, 
and a web based search, supplemented with interview data from industry experts and from Élan 
management (collected in 2005 to 2006 in the context of a study of networking in the Irish 
biotechnology sector), we identified twelve spin-offs from Élan for the period post the adverse 
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event (no such list had previously been complied). In 2010 to 2012 we sought to interview the 
founders of these twelve spin-offs. Of the twelve spin-offs, three firms were no longer in 
existence, and it was not possible to establish contact with the founders. Of the remaining nine, 
three declined to be interviewed.  
Interviews were conducted with the founders or senior managers of six Élan spin-offs, 
all of whom were former Élan employees. The interviews were conducted face-to-face (2), or 
where this was not possible, by telephone (4). These semi-structured interviews were structured 
around three broad questions: what was the sequence of events leading to the formation of the 
spin-off? What was the founder’s perspective of the adverse event at Élan, including the career 
implications of the restructuring? And, did the parent firm, Élan, influence the early 
development of the spin-off? In addition to the interview data, information on each of the 
twelve spin-off firms was gathered through analysis of secondary sources (the Irish Times, an 
Irish newspaper, archive, the FAME database, web-based sources).  
In addition to the 2010-2012 data, we also draw on interviews conducted in 2005-2006 
with five Élan executives and five industry experts from industrial development agencies and 
private consultancies. These ten interviews were part of a study of networking in the Irish 
biotechnology sector. These interviews provide data on the evolution of Élan Corporation, and 
on the 2002 Élan crises and the spin-offs that occurred at that time.  
The data was analysed by identifying three discrete aspects of our case: the evolution 
of Élan Corporation, the adverse event at Élan, and the twelve spin-offs. The first step was to 
create a summary account of the emergence of Élan Corporation and of the adverse event at 
Élan. The nature of the triggering event was analysed by identifying themes relating the spin-
off formation (Table 2). The nature of the inherited resources and competences was analysed 
by first identifying from the interview data and the secondary data sources the resources and 
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competences that the spin-off exploited and then by coding these into a small number of 
discrete categories (Table 3).  
Insert Table 1:  Élan Spin-offs 
 
4. Case study: Élan Corporation 
4.1 The successful parent  
One explanation for the spin-off process is that parent organisations provide employees with 
learning opportunities such that successful firms breed successful spin-offs (Klepper 2002). 
However, as noted above, parent organisations differ in terms of cultures, structures, 
employment practices, incentive systems (Clarysse and Moray, 2004). Gomper et al. (2005) 
suggest that the culture and organisation of some parents provide a context conducive to 
learning, and that this is then associated with increased spin-off (what they refer to as ‘Xerox- 
and Fairchild- type firms), though Cordes et al. emphasise that how culture of a parent may 
change overtime as the firm increases in size (2014). 
Élan Corporation was a successful parent, though prior to 2002 it was not associated 
with any spin-offs. Élan Corporation was founded in 1969 by Donald Panoz. Panoz had sold 
his stake in Mylan Laboratories in the United States following a strategic disagreement with 
his board, as he failed to persuade them to move into new drug delivery systems. Panoz moved 
to Ireland to start Élan Corporation. What followed was aggressive growth over a thirty year 
period. By the end of the 1990s Élan had an annual turnover of over US$ 1 billion, with a stock 
market valuation high of US$ 22 billion in 2001.  
Élan Corporation is headquartered in Dublin. The initial business model pursed by Élan 
was to specialise in contract drug development, focussing on drug delivery systems such as 
drug absorption control technology for antibiotics produced by other global pharmaceutical 
firms. This was successful, and by the early 1980s Élan had secured contracts for the provision 
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of absorption technology for 25 pharmaceutical products with 16 different pharmaceutical 
companies. Élan’s Irish operations focussed on the development of drug delivery products in 
the Élan Drug Technologies unit in Athlone and a small laboratory at Trinity College Dublin. 
Élan’s Athlone (Ireland) facilities, along with its Gainsville (US) site, were the company’s core 
drug delivery locations.2  In Athlone, Élan undertook development work (e.g. pharma co-
vigilance and medical affairs) on the historical drug delivery intellectual property and process 
development work, as well as drug delivery manufacturing and some contract manufacturing 
for third parties. 
In the 1990s Élan’s interests extended into the area of neuroscience and the firm 
subsequently undertook the development of its own products for the treatment of Alzheimers 
disease, Parkinsons disease, and multiple sclerosis. Élan’s neuroscience drug discovery and 
pre-clinical research was primarily carried out in the company’s US-based laboratories in San 
Diego and San Francisco. 
Élan subsequently embarked on an aggressive acquisitions strategy and a strategy of 
building a web of strategic partnerships by acquiring minority stakes in a number of firms that 
in turn paid Élan licensing fees for its technology. The aggressive acquisition culture at Élan 
was referred to by one former executive (1994 to 2003) as “Élan testosterone” – what he 
described as “the ability to do what other companies were afraid to do” (Sheridan, 2008). 
This success of Élan was not associated with spin-off activity in Ireland prior to 2002, 
according to evidence from industry experts and from Élan executives. A network analysis of 
patent activity finds that Élan and its subsidiaries were dominant, though separate, to the 
network of Irish biotech researchers and firms (Van Egeraat and Curran, 2012). Industry 
analysts described Élan prior to the restructuring as being ‘hermetically sealed from the rest of 
                                                          
2 Élan Drug Technologies unit was subsequently sold to US-based Alkermes in 2011, in a deal worth €960 
million. 
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Ireland’s indigenous life sciences industry’, and as operating ‘on a different plane compared to 
the small-scale, undercapitalized ventures that otherwise constituted the sector’ (Sheridan, 
2008).  
While Élan may have represented an environment conducive to employee learning, 
there was a lack of spin-off activity prior to the adverse event. This may be due to the structure 
of the industry, with high barriers to entry, or it may reflect the opportunities for employees 
within Élan. The interview data reveals that most employees reported that they were satisfied 
with the working environment and opportunities provided by Élan prior to 2002. One former 
senior employee described Élan as ‘a great place to work. If things hadn’t happened the way 
they did, most people would still be there.’ From the perspective of the employees, Élan was, 
prior to the crises, a good employer: 
 
‘Élan was an excellent company to work for – great camaraderie, personal freedom, it 
was very dynamic; an empowering company….. Many people were happy there and 
would not necessarily have left’ (Founder, Spin-off 11) (Interview, 2012). 
 
 
4.2 The adverse event 
As noted above, adverse events include buy-outs; bankruptcy; downsizing; outsourcing; 
relocation; and divestitures (Lazonick, 2004). On February 8th 2002 Élan’s stock market value 
collapsed after it announced that the US Securities and Exchange Commission were 
investigating its accounting practices (specifically how it accounted for R&D expenditures). 
Élan’s share price declined by over ninety per cent; with its market capitalisation falling to US$ 
800 million. Élan responded by implementing a recovery plan which involved the divesting of 
a number of subsidiaries and licenses in an effort to drive down debt.  
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Élan responded to the share price collapse by appointing a new CEO, Kelly Martin, 
who implemented a recovery plan. The recovery involved the divesting of a number of 
subsidiaries and licenses in an effort to drive down debt.  One Élan executive described Kelly’s 
approach as: 
 
‘He decided to re-focus the business on the biopharmaceutical area, and he decided to 
divest the drug delivery business which is actually the original business’ (Élan 
Executive) (Interview, 2006). 
 
However, rather than functioning as a contract manufacturer that produced large 
volumes of tablets or capsules, Élan sought to incorporate its proprietary technology in third 
party product development:  
 
‘We want to apply our technology to the molecule and then protect our IP if you will, 
by manufacturing that product at a commercial scale and for that we would receive, for 
example development fees, milestone payments, royalties for the use of our technology 
and a manufacturing fee’ (Élan Executive 1) (Interview, 2006). 
 
Élan’s efforts to restructure saw it embark on a large scale sale of intellectual property, 
as well as the disposal of subsidiaries, in both its drug delivery and neurosciences business 
ventures. The restructuring of Élan was also associated with reductions in employee numbers. 
In the twelve month period from July 2002, worldwide employee numbers reduced from 
approximately 4,700 to 2,900 (1,800 less, including 800 that were part of the asset divestiture 
programme). By February 2004, Élan had completed a recovery and restructuring plan that 
20 
 
resulted in divestiture proceeds of over US$2 billion. Élan executives described the 
restructuring process and its impact as follows: 
 
‘We divested the people and some of the early stage development on new delivery 
technology’ (Élan Executive 2) (Interview, 2006). 
 
‘One of the by-products of that process was that a number of products got sold, as well 
as entities, sites and … and having sold them we did finish up being the manufacturer’ 
(Élan Executive 1) (Interview, 2006). 
 
The impact of the crises on the employees was described as follows: 
 
‘The restructuring was a trauma in the sense that many had worked in Elan for a very 
long time; it may have been their first and only job’ (Spin-off 12) (Interview, 2012). 
 
Employees responded to the divesture of biotechnology assets and reduction in 
employee numbers in different ways. Some ‘Élan alumni’ dispersed into existing biotech and 
pharmaceutical firms, as well as into legal and venture capital firms (Sheridan, 2008). Of 
interest in this study are the spin-offs that emerged in the aftermath of the adverse event. By 
2004, ten spin-off firms had emerged from Élan, with two more following by 2006 
 
5. Analysis: Parent – spin-off inter-organisational dynamics  
The crises at Élan and the implementation of a restructuring plan by new management represent 
an adverse event (Buenstorf, 2009). Twelve spin-offs emerged from Élan in the aftermath of 
the adverse event (Table 1). This section analyses the spin-offs in terms of (i) triggers to spin-
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off formation (drawing on the 2012 interviews with six spin-offs) and (ii) the relationship 
between the parent and the spin-off in terms of the genealogical inheritance of the spin-offs 
(drawing on the 2012 interviews with six spin-offs, the 2006 interviews with the Élan 
executives and industry experts, and the secondary data sources). 
 
5.1 Triggers to spin-off formation 
Where an adverse event renders future employment at the parent firm less attractive or even 
impossible, Buenstorf categorises the spin-off as a necessity spin-off (2009). As discussed 
above, the adverse event and the restructuring of Élan involved significant job losses. In this 
regard, following Buenstorf (2009), it could be argued that the adverse event at Élan created a 
situation where employment was less attractive and therefore the spin-offs should be classified 
as necessity spin-offs. However, a number of themes emerge from the interviews that suggest 
that the classification of the spin-offs as ‘necessity’ spin-offs does not fully reflect the 
experience of some of the founders (Table 2).  
A theme evident in the interviews was the extent of ‘alternative employment 
opportunities’, either within Élan, or in other organisations. While some founders spoke of 
alternative employment opportunities within Élan, or in other organisations, others perceived 
they had no desirable employment opportunities within Élan, or outside of Élan, thereby fitting 
the Buenstorf (2009) idea that these spin-offs were created in a context of necessity. As such, 
the interview data shows that some of the spin-offs fit Buenstorf (2009) classification of 
necessity spin-offs. For example, Spin-off 12 can be classified as a ‘necessity’ spin-off, in that 
it was triggered by an adverse event and the interviewee considered the Élan restructuring as a 
‘push factor’, while in Spin-off 11, the founders believed that there were few alternative 
employment opportunities in other firms (Table 2). The case of Spin-off 11, a professional 
services provider, highlights how even where employees perceived a lack of similar 
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employment opportunities in other organisations (due to the employees’ specialist knowledge), 
the adverse event created an unexpected opportunity to start a new firm (Table 2).  
Another common theme in the interviews was ‘unexpected opportunities’ and the 
‘opportunistic acquisition of Élan assets’ as important elements of the start-up (Table 2). One 
further theme that occurred in two of the interviews was ‘desire to start-up’, whereby the 
founder described the adverse event as presenting an unexpected opportunity to realise a more 
general desire to engage in starting a business. From the interview data, it is apparent that a 
number of the spin-offs were formed in circumstances where the causal factor could not be 
regarded as necessity (Spin-off 1, Spin-off 9, and Spin-off 10) (Table 2).  
In the case of Spin-off 1, the manager of an in-house unit took advantage of the 
opportunity created in the wake of the restructuring to assume control of the unit and establish 
it as a company in its own right. The founders had been directors of this unit, which operated 
as an internal business within the parent company. When Élan announced they would close this 
particular unit in 2002, both founders were offered other roles within the organisation. 
However, the founders declined these offers as they believed that the unit closure offered them 
the opportunity to set up their own business. Commenting on the process, one founder stated: 
 
‘We felt there was a niche for a high-class, regulatory-compliant research organisation, 
and the restructuring gave us the final push to do it’ (Founder 2, Spin-off 1) (Interview, 
2012).  
 
‘It was simply an opportunity... This was the middle of the Celtic Tiger and there were 
ample possibilities…I had gained a lot of experience at Élan, both technical and 
commercial….. and a great deal of know-who knowledge. Élan had been a great 
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company to work for, very entrepreneurial and I had been given a lot of responsibility’ 
(Founder 1, Spin-off 1) (Interview, 2012). 
 
The founders developed an ‘outline proposal’ and the following week approached Élan 
with the proposition to lease the building and equipment from Élan (Founder 1, Spin-off 1) 
(Interview, 2012). This unprompted approach was welcomed by Élan, as it ensured that the 
unit would not be dissolved. In the spin-off’s first year, it undertook contact work for Élan and 
for new clients. After the first year, its client base consisted solely of new clients. 
In Spin-off 10, while the founders were made redundant, suggesting a ‘necessity’ spin-
off, some of the founders had already gone into new jobs. For these founders, the adverse event 
created an unexpected opportunity to acquire IP from Élan. In Spin-off 9, the adverse event 
created the opportunity to acquire data that was ‘very valuable, but Élan were interested in 
moving on’ (Interview, 2010). Management level employees found themselves in a position to 
acquire intellectual property that became available as a result of Élan’s asset divestiture 
program. The founders (Spin-off 9) explained ‘…during the late 1990’s Élan had maybe 50 
people involved in developing new technologies for drug delivery at a facility in a university…. 
we acquired the drug delivery technologies which were being researched at this facility’ (Spin-
off 9) (Interview, 2010).  
 
Insert Table 2: Triggers to spin-off formation 
 
5.2 Genealogical inheritance of spin-offs 
Initial resource configurations in start-ups impact subsequent growth (Bamford et al., 1999). 
According to the theories of spin-off formation, spin-off inherit knowledge, resources and 
competences from the parents firm, and that spin-offs from successful parents inherit resources 
and competences that allow them to be successful (Basu et al., 2015; Boschma and Frenken, 
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2011; Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006). Elements of a spin-offs genealogical inheritance include the 
transfer of technical ‘R&D competence’, broader ‘innovation competence’, and market or 
business competence (Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterji 2009; Asheim et al., 2011; Lejpras, 2014; 
Qian and Acs, 2013). An analysis of all 12 spin-offs, drawing on both the interview data and 
secondary data on the spin-offs, categorises the genealogical inheritance as including: related 
business competence, which for some included competence at exploiting IP, reputational and 
network advantages, and tangible resources (Table 3). 
  
Related business competence: competence at commercialising IP  
The data illustrates that the spin-offs exploited ‘inherited’ competence from Élan as the 
business models of the spin-offs typically related to Élan in terms of aspects of the founders 
learning, that is the experience and knowledge developed in Élan (Table 3). In the seven 
product-based spin-offs it was the competence of commercialising IP and bringing it through 
clinical trials and finding complementary IP and partners that was critical to the development 
of each spin-off. One interviewee, with knowledge of multiple spin-offs, explained the 
influence of Élan on the spin-offs as:  
 
‘The spin-offs cloned a lot of Élan processes/methodologies/ development of IP, and 
Élan’s approach to business’ (Spin-off 11) (Interview, 2012). 
 
A direct relationship between the resources and competence of the spin-off and Élan is 
most obvious in the context where the spin-off acquired IP or assets from Élan. For example, 
in Spin-off 10, co-founded in 2005 by the Executive Vice-President of Business and Corporate 
development, who had been responsible for Élan’s US$2 billion asset disposal programme, and 
two other executives, who held senior Élan positions in finance and business development (one 
25 
 
of whom later acquired the firm), the business model was to in-license rights to products that 
have either received FDA approval, or that are in late-stage clinical development. Successful 
products were then sold into the market US market. The ‘trio’ that had built up Élan’s drug 
delivery business, founded Spin-off 3, a drug development business, that replicated Élan’s 
business model in that it sought to improve already developed drugs.  
 
Related business competence: exploiting ‘in house’ business services experiences 
In service based spin-offs (five of the twelve spin-offs) the founders exploited experiences from 
Élan to offer similar services to new markets. In the case of the biotech sector the provision of 
services includes laboratory based support services to pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
firms, as well as professional service based businesses. In these service based spin-offs the 
founders used the experiences they had gained at Élan to deliver services that related to the 
roles they performed in Élan. These services were provided to other Pharma businesses, though 
in some cases the focus was on a broader range of industry sectors. Two spin-offs provided 
laboratory services to the Pharma sector (Spin-off 1 and Spin-off 6) while a third provided 
contract production services (Spin-off 2). The founders of the two spin-offs providing 
laboratory services had experience in the R&D division in Élan, while the founder of the 
contract production services had experience in in managing production in Élan’s main 
production facility. In the other two service-based spin-offs, a consulting service business 
(Spin-off 5) and a venture capital business (Spin-off 11), the founders also exploited their Élan 
experiences. Spin-off 5, started by a statistician from Élan, provided statistical analysis services 
to pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, medical and food sectors in Ireland, the UK and the US.  
 
Reputational and network advantages  
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Most common in the data are references by the spin-offs to the reputational and network 
advantages of having been formerly associated with Élan. Prior to the crises Élan was 
recognised for its rapid growth and it had been involved in partnerships with other businesses, 
including a number of acquisitions. This meant that many senior Élan employees engaged in 
significant levels of contact with other pharmaceutical companies, while employees 
specialising in drug development engaged in in-depth contact with other clinical research 
organisations. One former Élan employee, now employed in a venture capital firm, commented 
of the Élan spin-offs:  
 
‘There is an informal network of people who do engage with each other on an on-going 
basis’ (Interview, 2006)  
 
References in the data to the importance of networks included:  
 
‘The Élan Network… I do ring these people up if I have an issue or question’ (Spin-off 
4) (Interview, 2010). 
 
‘I would have known many of our potential customers- I knew the heads of clinical 
trials’ (Spin-off 1) (Interview, 2012). 
 
‘I cultivated a significant network of international contacts across the industry, which 
provided me with useful industry knowledge in its early years’ of the spin-off’ (Spin-
off 10) (Interview, 2012). 
 
Tangible resources  
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Five of the twelve spin-offs acquired tangible resources from Élan, including IP resources 
(Spin-off 4, Spin-off 9); seed finance (Spin-off 3); the opportunity to acquire Élan’s equity 
stake in the business (Spin-off 8); physical facilities (Spin-off 1); and Élan was an initial 
customer (Spin-off 1) or had a business agreement with the spin-off (Spin-off 8, Spin-off 10, 
Spin-off 12) (Table 3). In some of the spin-offs there are no direct references to Élan providing 
the spin-off with resources, though the use of redundancy payments as seed capital was 
common in many of the spin-offs.  
Insert Table 3:  Parent- spin-off relations 
 
6. Discussion 
6.1 Triggers to spin-off formation  
This study explored spin-off creation in the context of an adverse event. As noted above, two 
types of spin-offs are recognised in extant literature – opportunity spin-offs and necessity spin-
offs (Figure 1). Spin-offs classified as opportunity spin-offs are associated with founders who 
seek to apply the learning and experiences that they have developed in the parent firm by 
creating a new firm. Implicitly, opportunity spin-offs are triggered by pull factors, the desire to 
exploit an opportunity. However, recent research has suggested that spin-offs characterised by 
the desire to exploit an opportunity may also be triggered by push factors, such as strategic 
disagreements within the parent firm. In contrast to opportunity spin-offs, spin-offs that occur 
in the context of an adverse corporate event (e.g. bankruptcy, declining sales, and adverse 
changes in organisational cultures) are typically classified as necessity spin-offs.  
Buenstorf’s (2009) classification of necessity spin-offs assumes that the adverse event 
is associated with necessity entrepreneurship in that the employee is compelled to leave the 
firm. However, this dichotomous representation of spin-offs as either opportunity spin-offs or 
necessity spin-offs may mask important heterogeneity within the population of corporate spin-
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offs, with recent research suggesting that necessity spin-offs are a heterogeneous set of firms 
(Bruneel et al, 2012).  
As the spin-offs in this study occurred in the context of an adverse event, they are, using 
Buenstorf’s (2009) and Bruneel et al.’s (2012) typology, necessity spin-offs. However, the case 
data shows that many of the individuals involved in these spin-offs did not feel compelled to 
leave the parent firm, with the founders speaking of possibilities that arose specifically in the 
context of the adverse event. That is, while the spin-off was created ‘in response to an adverse 
development in the parent firm’ (Bruneel et al., 2012:944), future employment at the parent 
firm was not specifically ‘less attractive or even impossible’.  
This suggests that the necessity spin-off category proposed by Buenstorf (2009) 
captures the context in which the spin-off occurs, the adverse event, but does not capture the 
employment choices within the organisation of the founding entrepreneurs.  That is, while an 
adverse event such as corporate restructuring, asset divestiture, or bankruptcy may be a 
negative event for the parent firm and for some employees, resulting in necessity spin-offs, the 
same adverse event may actually provide new opportunities for some employees – particularly 
management-level employees who are in a position to take advantage of the parent firm’s 
distress. Furthermore, the case data shows that Klepper’s opportunity spin-off categorisation 
does not adequately describe the spin-offs, as founders of the spin-offs did not speak of the 
identification of new knowledge or of triggers such as strategic disagreements. As such, some 
of the spin-offs in this study do not fit Buenstorf’s (2009) necessity spin-off classification or 
Klepper and Thompson’s (2010) opportunity spin-off classifications. Based on our analysis of 
the data we propose that these spin-offs could be classified as opportunistic spin-offs, defining 
opportunistic spin-offs as follows: 
  
29 
 
Opportunistic spin-offs are where, in the aftermath of an adverse event, an employee 
exploits an unexpected opportunity to engage in entrepreneurship, but does not feel 
compelled to establish the spin-off. 
 
These opportunistic spin-offs were unexpected new ventures, in that the individuals did 
not anticipate starting a new venture and in that the opportunities were unanticipated. Some 
opportunistic spin-offs arise in the context of an adverse event for the firm that creates the 
opportunity for some employees to acquire IP or R&D assets that can be further developed and 
commercialised, ultimately leading to the formation of spin-offs. This is consistent with 
Lazonick who found that, while for most employees the consequences of an event such as 
restructuring will be beyond their control, some management-level employees may be in a 
position to take the initiative and acquire a product or process unit from the existing corporation 
(2004). By categorising some spin-offs in the wake of an adverse event as opportunistic, this 
emphasises how the changed circumstances at the parent created by the adverse event lead to 
some employees, particularly senior and experienced employees, to exploit the changes to their 
own advantage. This extended categorisation of spin-offs is outlined in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1: Triggers to spin-off formation. 
 
6.2 Genealogical inheritance in ‘opportunistic’ spin-offs  
Theories of spin-off formation argue that the process of spin-off creation involves spin-offs 
inheriting resources and competences from the parent (Klepper, 2008). The resources and 
competences that a spin-off might exploit include tacit or formal knowledge relating to 
production, technology or market (Sapienza et al., 2004), with some evidence that non-
technical knowledge may be more important than technical knowledge, even in the context of 
spin-offs in technology sectors (Chatterji, 2009). This knowledge may be applied in the same 
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industry, what Muendler et al. (2012) refers to as ‘horizontal’ spin-offs, or in an industry 
different from the parent firm, ‘vertical’ spin-offs. 
The case data demonstrates the heterogeneous nature of genealogical inheritance of the 
spin-offs. The spin-offs included examples of the following: (i) management level employees 
who acquired assets (intellectual property, in this case); (ii) managers of an in-house unit that 
took advantage of the opportunity created in the wake of the restructuring to assume control of 
their unit and establish it as an independent company; and (iii) employees who set up their own 
company based on their expertise in the provision of a niche in-house service, when the parent 
firm’s restructuring strategy involves phasing out that particular in-house service. The 
opportunities pursued by the founders and the resources the spin-offs acquired from the parent 
reflect the founders previous job roles, responsibilities, experiences and seniority. 
The inherited resources and competences of these spin-offs include knowledge and 
competence relating to the parent’s technologies, products and business models (Sapienza et 
al., 2004) as well as the networks established during employment at the parent and the 
reputational assets of the parent. For example, the spin-offs variously drew on resources from 
the parent, including financial resources, in the form of redundancy payments to founders; 
access to facilities; access to employees, in the form of hiring employees from the parent; 
access to IP; and networks developed through work, including business contacts and the more 
informal support of former colleagues. The importance of these resources is consistent with 
research in the entrepreneurship domain that demonstrates the importance of business and 
personal networks (Baker et al., 2003; Johannisson, 1990; Witt, 2004), know-who knowledge 
(Sarasvathy, 2001), and prior reputational capital (Shane and Cable 2002) in the venture 
creation process. With respect to reputational capital, the context for this study was one where 
the perception of the founders was that they could exploit the reputation of the parent because 
of its prior success. This may not be the case in the context of other adverse events, as the 
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adverse event might create negative reputational effects for the founders. This issue warrants 
further research in the context of other adverse events, such as corporate failures during the 
financial crises, to understand how founders of spin-offs positioned their new ventures in the 
context of negative reputations of the parent firm. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 There is increased attention within the entrepreneurship domain to the study of the 
mobility of entrepreneurs between for-profit corporate organisations and new organisations 
(Fryges and Wright 2014; Wright, 2011). In seeking to understand entrepreneurship Dimov 
(2010) argues that entrepreneurship researchers need to identify the ‘generative mechanisms 
that that explain particular sequences of events’ (2010:70). As such this study explored the 
inter-organisational dynamics, in terms of the triggers to spin-off formation and the inherited 
resources exploited by a spin-off, between a parent characterised by an adverse event and the 
spin-offs that emerged. 
This study contributes to the literature on spin-offs by identifying a set of spin-offs that 
occurred in the wake of an adverse event that were characterised by ‘unexpected 
opportunities’, ‘opportunistic acquisition of assets’ and, perhaps reflecting the seniority and 
experience of those involved, ‘alternative employment opportunities’. As such, these spin-offs 
do not fit into the existing typologies of spin-offs (Bruneel et al., 2012; Buenstorf, 2009; 
Klepper and Thompson, 2010; Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003). These spin-offs are 
described as ‘opportunistic spin-offs’, that is, spin-offs that occur in the wake of an adverse 
event where the entrepreneur exploits an unexpected opportunity to engage in 
entrepreneurship but does not feel compelled to establish the spin-off. This more nuanced 
definition of spin-offs may help explain the conflicting results of existing research that relates 
spin-off type to subsequent spin-off performance (Bruneel et al., 2012, Rocha et al., 2015). 
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As theories of spin-offs emphasise the importance of inherited competences the study explored 
the genealogical inheritance of spin-offs, demonstrating that the competence advantage which 
Klepper identifies in spin-offs extends beyond technical and related business competences and 
that the genealogical inheritance of a spin-off may depend not only on the ‘successes’ of the 
parent (the ‘success breeds success’ argument) but also on the seniority of the employees 
involved in the spin-off. 
More generally, this study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by 
demonstrating how triggering events precipitate entrepreneurial action (Bygrave, 1989b; 
Degeorge and Fayolle, 2011).  While the idea that transitions to entrepreneurship might be 
the outcome of an immediate triggering event is not new, it is a relatively under researched 
area in the entrepreneurship domain (for early arguments of the importance of triggering events 
see Shapero, 1984 and Bygrave, 1989a, 1989b). Bygrave argued that researchers should pay 
attention to triggers because a relatively small change in the antecedents to entrepreneurship, 
for example, personal circumstances such as job loss, sociological factors such as role models, 
and environmental changes such as competition, can trigger entrepreneurship. More recent 
research has demonstrated that frustration at work, including gender discrimination may result 
in a transition to self-employment (Tlaiss, 2013); that some life traumas necessitate 
discontinuous (rather than an incremental) career change, and that this may result in a transition 
to self-employment (Haynie and Shepherd, 2011); and that ‘displacement’ is an important 
trigger in the entrepreneurship process, which includes both positive and negative forces and 
which may be internal or external to the individual (Degeorge and Fayolle, 2011). Degeorge 
and Fayolle show that the process of entrepreneurship may be triggered by what they term as 
‘the imposed (unwanted) trigger’, which includes, though is not limited to, external factors 
such as changes to an individual’s professional life (2011: 262). This study contributes to this 
literature by demonstrating how unexpected changes in an individual’s circumstances triggered 
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unexpected new ventures, unexpected in that the individuals did not anticipate starting a new 
venture and unexpected in that the opportunities were unanticipated. In the context of this 
study, the unexpected happenings were the changes in the parent firm. 
There are a number of limitations to this research. First, the study focussed on one 
industry and one adverse event. The combination of circumstances that occurred in this case, 
and which relate to the spin-offs founded, may not occur in other contexts. However, given the 
importance of spin-offs to industry evolution, studies in different contexts are required to 
illustrate the causes of spin-offs and one advantage of this context was that the firm was not 
characterised by spin-offs prior to the adverse event (unlike, for example, Buenstorf and 
Fornahl’s (2009) study). Second, this study focussed only on those employees involved in 
creating spin-offs. However, other managers exploited their experience and knowledge by 
creating new careers (for example, the Vice-President and General Counsel, joined a legal firm 
to develop a new expertise for the practice; senior managers and executives joined Irish, UK 
and US Pharma and biotechnology firms).This was particularly the case for Élan’s US 
employees. While some of the spin-offs in the study involved employees who worked, or had 
worked, for Élan in the US, typically Élan’s US businesses were partnerships, and as such the 
managers did not get the opportunity to acquire intellectual property, and therefore managers 
‘filtered’ to other companies. 
Third, the focus on founding conditions and triggers does not preclude other factors 
explaining why these individuals created the spin-offs (Walter and Heinrichs, 2015). Most 
obviously, based on the entrepreneurship literature, there is a body of literature that argues 
‘who you are’, in terms of personality, family and career experiences, influences whether you 
become an entrepreneur (Bosma et al., 2012; Carroll and Mosakowski, 1987; Chell, 2008; 
Donkels, 1991; Kreuger, 2000). Therefore it is possible that some of these individuals may 
have created spin-offs irrespective of the adverse event. However, as one of the founders 
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commented on Élan as an employer: ‘You get very comfortable [in salaried employment]; 
when nobody is paying the mortgage you get to know why people are reluctant to leave the 
relative safety of an established company’.  
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Figure 1: Triggers to spin-off formation 
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Table 1:  Élan Spin-offs 
Spin-off Year Spin-off activity Founder(s) former role(s) in Élan Data sources 
Spin-off 1 2002 Services: laboratory testing 
services 
 
2 senior managers from R&D  
- Clinical pharmacology 
- Chief Scientific Office, responsibility for bio analytical laboratory 
Interview (telephone) 
Secondary source data 
Spin-off 2 2002 Services: contract 
manufacturing 
Production Manager Secondary source data 
Spin-off 3 
 
2002 
 
 
Drug development Led by Executive Vice-President of R&D, co-founded with: 
- Managing Director: Business Development 
- Managing Director: Pharmaceuticals 
Secondary source data 
Spin-off 4 2003 Drug development  
 
 
 
2 senior executives  
- Executive Vice-President of R&D (from Spin-off 8) 
- Vice president, commercial development 
Team also includes the Managing Director of Élan’s biotechnology drug 
delivery business unit  
Interview (face-to-face) 
Secondary source data 
Spin-off 5 2003 Services: statistics consultant Employee Secondary source data 
Spin-off 6 2003 Services: analytical Employee Secondary source data 
Spin-off 7  2003 Drug development Executive  
- Director in technical support in Élan's drug delivery business 
- Founding team includes a biotech entrepreneur. 
Secondary source data 
Spin-off 8 2004 Drug development 2004 buy-out led by Chief Finance Office;  
with Vice President of Global Strategic Planning 
Secondary source data 
Spin-off 9 2004 Drug development  A Venture Capital Firm, with a non-Élan management team Interview (face-to-face) 
Secondary source data 
Spin-off 10  2005 Drug development Executive vice-president of business and corporate development 
(responsible for – Élan Enterprises) 
Management team included: 
- Senior manager - finance  
- Senior manager - business development 
Interview (telephone) 
Secondary source data 
Spin-off 11 2005 Services: venture capital fund 
management 
2 executives 
- Head of Commercial Development 
- Business Development Director 
- Co-founded with former Executive (who left Élan before crises)  
Interview (telephone) 
Secondary source data 
Spin-off 12  2006 Drug development-acquired IP 
from Spin-off 8  
Executive vice-president of business and corporate development 
(responsible for – Élan Enterprises) (from Spin-off 10) 
Interview (telephone) 
Secondary source data 
Note: Spin-offs 2, 4, 10 are no longer actively trading or have dissolved; Spin-offs 1, 3, 10 have been acquired by, or merged with, a foreign (not Irish) firm, while Spin-
off 8 was acquired by another Élan spin-off. 
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Table 2:  Triggers to spin-off formation 
Spin-off Illustrative text Classification of triggers 
Spin-off 1 
(laboratory testing 
services) 
- We were offered other roles in the organisation, including project management roles. This was not 
for me, and I preferred to leave the company.  
 
- I considered the situation and observed the functioning bioanalysis laboratory, which was located 
in a great purposely build facility on the Élan site. What was going to happen to this laboratory? I 
considered it over the week-end. I had always been interested in setting up my own business, 
coming from an entrepreneurial family. And this offered me an opportunity.  
 
- I developed an outline proposal and the week after approached Élan with the proposition to lease 
the building and equipment from Élan. 
Alternative roles on offer 
within current organisation 
 
Unexpected opportunity 
 
Desire to start-up 
 
 
Opportunistic acquisition of 
Élan assets 
Spin-off 4 
(drug development) 
- Founded on a number of drug technologies, based on Élan IP. The Élan informal network is 
important for both technical and business knowledge flow- I worked with them and I trust them.   
Opportunistic acquisition of 
Élan assets 
Spin-off 9  
(drug development) 
- In 2002 Élan decided to divest the assets. By the time the deal was done in 2004, nobody was left 
here (in the Élan research centre at Trinity) so there were boxes of data. They were very valuable 
but Élan were interested in moving on.  
 
- A venture capital company put together a management team to run the business and provided 
finance to acquire the assets. 
Unexpected opportunity 
 
 
 
Opportunistic acquisition of 
Élan assets 
Spin-off 10 
(drug development)  
- Founder and some others in a position to start new businesses. We had been made redundant at the 
same time, we had no need to rush, some of us had already gone into new jobs. 
 
- Élan was a great place to work. If things hadn’t happened the way they did, most people would 
still be there. That said, I may have at some point pursued my own business.  
 
- Spin-off set up to bring in IP and undertake development. 
Alternative roles in other 
organisations 
 
 
Desire to start-up 
 
Opportunistic acquisition of 
Élan assets 
Spin-off 11 
(venture capital fund 
management) 
- We had extensive involvement in licensing and acquisition projects. In late 1990s/2000s very few 
companies in sector had in-house venture capital arms. So there were not many alternative 
employers for venture capital experts.  
- For [one founder] the transition to the spin-off was punctuated with one year work experience. 
Limited alternative roles in 
other organisations 
 
Alternative roles in other 
organisations 
Spin-off 12 
(drug development) 
- Elan’s restructuring was a push factor. I took some time off and decided to progress the idea of 
creating something new. 
No alternative roles in 
organisation 
Source: Interview data.  
44 
 
Table 3:  Parent- spin-off relations  
Spin-off Case evidence of inherited competences and resources Classification of resources and 
competences 
Spin-off 1 
(laboratory testing services) 
- Service directly relates to founders prior roles in Élan. 
- Leased Élan’s purpose built bio-analytical facility from Élan 
- Exploited Élan networks. 
- Élan an initial customer 
Related business competence  
Physical resources 
Networks 
Sales 
Spin-off 2 
(contract manufacturing) 
- Experience of manufacturing at Élan’s Irish operations 
 
Related business competence  
 
Spin-off 3 
(drug development) 
- Replicated business model from Élan 
- Seed finance from Élan 
Related business competence 
Financial resource 
Spin-off 4  
(drug development) 
- IP from Élan 
- Exploited Élan networks 
IP resources 
Networks 
Spin-off 5 
(statistical consultancy) 
- Service directly relates to founders prior job in Élan. 
 
Related business competence 
 
Spin-off 6  
(analytical services) 
- Service directly relates to founders prior job in Élan. Related business competence 
 
Spin-off 7  
(drug development) 
- Draws directly on experiences from founder’s prior job in Élan 
 
Related business competence 
 
Spin-off 8 
(drug development) 
- Élan transfers equity interests to the spin-off 
- Business agreements with Élan 
Financial resource 
Sales 
Spin-off 9  
(drug development) 
- Acquired IP from Élan.  
- Élan retained a small stake (5%) in spin-off 
- Élan employee is member of Board 
- Exploited Élan’s network 
IP resources 
Reputation 
Networks 
Networks 
Spin-off 10 
(drug development) 
- Replicated elements of  Élan’s business model 
- Business agreements with Élan 
Related business competence 
Sales 
Spin-off 11 
(venture capital fund 
management) 
- Service directly relates to founders prior career roles in Élan. 
- Used founders’ Élan experiences to build reputation (cited deals done in 
Élan). 
Related business competence 
Reputation 
 
Spin-off 12 
(drug development) 
- Business agreements with Élan 
 
Sales 
Source: Interview data and secondary sources, including Irish Times Archive. 
 
